{"id":2207,"date":"2019-07-03T11:39:48","date_gmt":"2019-07-03T09:39:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.external-democracy-promotion.eu\/de\/?p=2207"},"modified":"2019-07-03T11:39:48","modified_gmt":"2019-07-03T09:39:48","slug":"democracy-promotion-in-eu-enlargement-negotiations-more-interaction-less-hierarchy-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.external-democracy-promotion.eu\/de\/democracy-promotion-in-eu-enlargement-negotiations-more-interaction-less-hierarchy-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Democracy promotion in EU enlargement negotiations: more interaction, less hierarchy"},"content":{"rendered":"

This EDP Wire contribution briefly summarizes the article \u201c<\/em>Democracy promotion in EU enlargement negotiations: more interaction, less hierarchy<\/a>\u201d of the recent Democratization special issue \u201cThe negotiation of democracy promotion. Issues, parameters and consequences\u201c, edited by EDP network members Annika E. Poppe, Julia Leininger and Jonas Wolff. With the help of the generous support of the <\/em>Leibniz Association<\/a>, the entire special issue \u201c<\/em>The negotiation of democracy promotion: Issues, parameters and consequences<\/a>\u201d is available online as open access. The summary was prepared by Nora Berger-Kern.<\/em><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Scholars have conceptualized democracy promotion in the context of the EU enlargement process as a highly asymmetric relationship<\/strong>: While the EU sets the accession conditions, the role of the (potential) candidate country is to fulfil them. Nevertheless, reform demands for an EU membership are often not fulfilled. To explain this, Grimm proposes an interactive model <\/strong>of democracy promotion negotiations that takes both sides\u2019 agency and leverage into account. She argues that the relationship between the EU and accession candidates should be conceptualized as a dynamic interaction<\/strong> in the course of which the formulation, the scope, the procedure and pace of reforms are negotiated. Her interactive model<\/strong> complements the well-known set of external instruments with a set of domestic instruments, systematically taking external and domestic constraints into account.<\/p>\n

The interactive model: interplay, instruments, and domestic leverage<\/strong><\/p>\n

In most of the literature on democracy promotion, domestic actors are hardly if ever analyzed as independent actors that dispose of distinct and powerful instruments that are used to influence the process of negotiations, shape the reform agenda, and alter its output and outcomes. Instead, scholars tend to portray domestic actors foremost as \u2018unwilling\u2019 or \u2018unable\u2019 to democratic reform in order to explain a domestic actor\u2019s \u2018partial\u2019 or \u2018non-complying\u2019 behavior. In line with Poppe, Leininger and Wolff<\/a> and other contributions to this special issue, Grimm argues for a dynamic perspective on democracy promotion, which conceptualizes the external-domestic interplay as a permanent, interactive process of action and reaction<\/strong> through negotiations in which both sides are competent to take action independently. Not only the external, but also the domestic side disposes of a set of instruments employed to shape the reform agenda and its implementation (see Figure 1).<\/p>\n

Figure 1. Negotiating democracy promotion \u2013 the interplay model (taken from the original article<\/a>).<\/p>\n

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The instruments external actors<\/strong> dispose of include:<\/p>\n