In: Oxford, 2025; online edn, Oxford Academic, 10 Jan. 2025

Why do countries hosting United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations tend to consolidate authoritarian forms of governance, despite the UN’s own stated aim of promoting democratization? This book advances a theoretically innovative and empirically rich answer to this question: while the UN does not intentionally promote authoritarianism, it faces a number of constraints and dilemmas that give rise to what we call authoritarian enabling. Enabling can occur through two mechanisms, capacity-building and the creation of a permissive environment, which enhance the ability of host governments to engage in authoritarian behavior and signal to them that doing so is low cost. We illustrate these two mechanisms with four in-depth case studies of UN peacekeeping operations: the UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo / UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti / Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH), and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). While enabling stops short of the outright promotion of authoritarianism, it explains why the UN’s activities often appear to contradict its stated objectives and the outcomes it delivers fall short of its goals. In addition to its theoretical and empirical contributions, the book suggests how these dilemmas and challenges can be overcome.

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