With the upcoming transfer of power from leftist president Gustavo Petro to his newly elected radical-right successor Abelardo de la Espriella, Colombia faces a decisive shift in its approach to peace and violence. The implications extend not only to the still-unfinished implementation of the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC-EP guerrilla, but also to the state’s response to the fragmented landscape of persisting armed groups, the violence they inflict on civilians, and the illicit economies sustaining them. This EDP Wire, which was originally published as a PRIF Spotlight, analyzes what this political shift will likely mean for Colombia. This is also highly relevant for external actors aiming at supporting human rights and peacebuilding in the country.
This EDP Wire is a partial repost from PRIF Spotlight, where you can find the original.
Colombia’s political trajectory since the signing of the peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) in late 2016 has been shaped by a persistent paradox. On the one hand, the accord brought an end to the FARC-EP as a national-level guerrilla organization and led to the successful demobilization of roughly 11,000 FARCEP fighters [1], formally concluding Latin America’s longest-running armed conflict. On the other hand, peace has remained incomplete. The agreement’s ambitious agenda for political, social, and territorial transformation has progressed unevenly [2], while violence has persisted in many parts of the country [3]. Rather than marking a clear transition from war to peace, the post-agreement period has been characterized by the fragmentation and reconfiguration of armed violence. As the FARC-EP withdrew from many territories, a diverse range of armed organizations— including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), the post-paramilitary Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC, or Clan del Golfo), and several so-called FARCEP dissident groups—expanded their control of territories, populations, and illicit economies. The growth of these groups has meant violent rivalries that have taken a particularly heavy toll on the civilian population in the affected rural areas [4].
In this context, presidential elections do not merely represent routine political alternation. They function as critical junctures in which the meaning and direction of peace (and war) policies are being redefined. This was the case when, in 2018, Iván Duque was elected president—a politician from the rightwing Centro Democrático party who had campaigned fiercely against the peace agreement. The Duque government, in the end, formally remained committed to the accords, officially following a policy of “Peace with Legality” (Paz con Legalidad). Yet, implementation remained selective and uneven. Several institutions central to the agreement, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), faced persistent political contestation and budgetary constraints, prompting critics to argue that the government privileged security measures over the accord’s transformative components [5].
The victory of Gustavo Petro in 2022 marked another significant shift in Colombia’s post-agreement trajectory. In part, this election reflected the political opening produced by the 2016 Peace Agreement, which expanded the space for former opposition movements and progressive agendas. During his administration, Petro advanced several policy initiatives closely connected to key components of the peace process. In rural policy, for instance, land acquisition and redistribution efforts sought to reactivate long-standing agrarian reform commitments embedded in the agreement [6]. At the same time, these advances coexisted with mounting governance and security challenges, which Petro’s flagship security and peace initiative Paz Total (“Total Peace”) failed to address. The evolving security situation and the widespread criticism of the Paz Total policy constituted an important component of Abelardo de la Espriella’s campaign and certainly contributed to his victory [7]. The following section briefly examines the president-elect’s campaign promises and their potential implications, focusing first on his proposed alternative to the Paz Total agenda and, second, on his position regarding the 2016 Peace Agreement.
WITH IRON FIST AGAINST “NARCOTERRORISM”
In contrast to both the 2016 peace agreement and Petro’s Paz Total policy, for De la Espriella there is no armed conflict in Colombia, but merely “criminal violence” associated with narcotrafficking and other illicit economies. Consequently, in his three-page program, De la Espriella emphasizes that there will be no negotiations with criminals. Instead, he promises to massively eradicate coca crops by all means, including through aerial fumigation (which is currently prohibited in Colombia), and to militarily reestablish the state’s monopoly on the use of force and territorial control over the entire country [8].
This suggests a radical shift toward an entirely security-centered and militarized approach to public order and armed conflict. By emphasizing the fight against “narcoterrorism,” it mirrors the approach adopted by President Álvaro Uribe in the early 2000s (2002– 2010) in the context of the US War on Terror and the US-supported Plan Colombia [9]. In addition, in promising the construction of ten mega prisons across the country, he adopts core elements of the “iron fist” approach (mano dura) against crime currently represented by El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele [10]. Such a reorientation can produce short-term effects, and a stronger security presence in contested territories may increase the perception of state capacity and responsiveness. Yet, it is hard to see how it could replicate the (partial) successes of either Uribe or Bukele. Unlike El Salvador’s gangs, Colombia’s armed groups are much stronger militarily, have vastly different economic resources, are connected to transnational criminal networks, and are spread across a vast, geographically fragmented territory. In contrast to Uribe’s offensive against the FARC-EP in the early 2000s, the main armed challenge to the state’s authority no longer comes from a single hierarchical guerrilla organization, but from a complex set of armed groups that are each internally much more decentralized and flexible. As President Daniel Noboa’s “war” on criminal groups in Ecuador and many other experiences from the region show, the result of a one-sided military offensive thus might well be more criminal violence, not less [11].
In addition, the experience with both Uribe and Bukele underscores the significant risks of a militarized mano dura approach. In both cases, massive human rights violations have been documented, including the killing of thousands of innocent civilians falsely presented by the Colombian military as guerrilla fighters killed in action (“false positives”) [12]. Aerial fumigation of coca crops with pesticides has significant negative effects on the environment and on the health and land use of the peasant population, and can also increase the risks faced by non-com batants, reinforcing patterns of civilian exposure to violence as retaliation by the armed groups [13]. Generally, empirical research on Colombia’s recent history suggests that exclusively coercive approaches have had limited success in reducing violence sustainably, while often contributing to weakened trust in state institutions and leaving underlying socio-economic drivers of conflict unaddressed [14].
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 2016 PEACE AGREEMENT
In and of itself, a security-centered reorientation of state action against armed groups will likely have significant implications for the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. The comprehensive agreement sought not only to end armed confrontation and facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the FARC-EP, but also to transform the conditions that sustained the armed conflict, with a particular focus on building peace in historically marginalized territories. Key areas include the promise of an integral rural reform, the substitution of illicit crops, and a comprehensive system of transitional justice, including the above-mentioned JEP [15].
When it comes to Colombia’s conflict-affected rural areas, De la Espriella has promised to end what he considers a “false agrarian reform.” Instead of redistributing land and strengthening indigenous, afro-Colombian and peasant communities, the new president wants to turn peasants into entrepreneurs and expand the agricultural frontier.[16] At the same time, preliminary budget proposals call for eliminating the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (ANT), a key agency in charge of implementing the land reform [17]. His most explicit break with the peace agreement is in the area of illicit crop substitution: In contrast to De la Espriella’s approach to massively eradicating coca crops, the accords provide for a cooperative scheme combining the voluntary abandonment of coca cultivation with the promotion of alternatives.
During the campaign, De la Espriella openly confronted the JEP. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace is a crucial pillar of the agreement, providing a transitional justice mechanism to investigate, prosecute, and sanction serious crimes committed during the armed conflict, while prioritizing truth, accountability, victims’ rights, and reconciliation. Just last year, the JEP handed down its first sentences. Responding to the fact that the JEP provides for alternative sanctions (rather than imprisonment) and also persecutes members of the armed forces if they committed serious crimes, De la Espriella has criticized the institution as “a court designed to wash the blood off the hands of FARC members and persecute the nation’s heroes,” promising to eliminate it [18]. While the JEP is protected by law, which makes its elimination difficult, the new president might try to suspend its sentences through presidential decrees. In addition, he can be expected to weaken, or even cripple the JEP by reducing funding. In fact, preliminary plans include a 90% cut in the JEP budget, eliminating the institution by 2030 [19].
Regarding the reincorporation of former FARC-EP combatants, the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN)—the institution responsible for coordinating the process—and the continued presence of the United Nations Verification Mission may be at risk [20]. Together, they serve as key confidence-building mechanisms that signal the state’s continued commitment to the peace agreement. The closure of the ARN or the non-renewal of the Mission’s mandate would increase uncertainty among ex-combatants and host communities that have benefited from the reincorporation process, further complicating local reconciliation efforts [21]. Such mistrust may also heighten the risk that some former combatants disengage from the reincorporation process or become more vulnerable to coercion, recruitment, or targeted violence by armed groups.
CONCLUSION
Campaign promises are usually, at best, a vague indication of later policies. Uncertainty is even higher with political outsiders like De la Espriella. Still, everything suggests that Colombia is facing a crucial about-face in its approach to peace and violence. In contrast to the 2016 peace agreement and the agenda promoted by the outgoing Petro government, the new president will most likely adopt a militarized security-centered approach that neither seeks to combine military operations with a more integral state presence in conflict-affected rural areas nor addresses the structural causes of violence in Colombia’s countryside. Moreover, little indicates that the new government will try to avoid human rights violations and other “collateral damages” in the context of its planned fight against armed groups and illicit economies. Finally, while De la Espriella cannot simply revoke the 2016 peace agreement or eliminate core institutions like the JEP, he will probably do as much as possible to undermine their operations.
What remains to be seen is the opposition that the new government might face from within the Colombian state, including from Congress and the traditionally quite strong and independent Constitutional Court. Also, the consolidation of a strong leftist opposition and De la Espriella’s narrow victory suggest that there is potential for an oppositional movement able to contest an overly radical turn to the right. Internationally, in contrast, the new president will face more support than constraints. This certainly concerns Colombia’s most important ally, the US, which can be expected to support even the most drastic and openly illegal measures justified as directed against “narcoterrorism,” but also the rest of the region, which is currently dominated by right-wing governments. In this context, the influence of the EU and European governments, including Germany, will be more limited than in the past. Still, offering continued diplomatic and material support for the 2016 Peace Agreement and its institutions will be crucial. In addition, Germany should offer protection to threatened individuals, including human rights defenders, and maintain long-term cooperation with local peace initiatives, community organizations, and conflict-affected municipalities. In times of increasingly securitized and militarized national policies, such partnerships are key to strengthen local resilience, preserve spaces for dialogue, and help sustain the social foundations of peace [22].
References and further reading: prif.org/spotlight0926-fn
Find the original text, including boxes on Petro’s “Total Peace” Policy and a Brief Profile of Abelardo de la Espriella, here.